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I. INTRODUCTION
The traditional at-will employment rule permitted employers broad dis-
cretion to discharge at-will employees without cause or justification. That is, an
employer could dismiss an at-will employee at any time, for any reason - good
or bad, or for no reason at all.' However, the discretion afforded employers by
the traditional at-will rule has been steadily eroding over the last half a century.2
Significantly, this erosion coincides with the development and expansion of the
public policy exception to the at-will employment rule.3 Generally, under the
public policy exception, a dismissed employee can recover tort damages if the
employee's termination violates a specific public policy interest of the state.
In West Virginia, the "substantial public policy exception ' 5 has evolved
into an employer's nightmare. In recent years, the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals has shown a propensity to liberally apply the exception, dis-
covering public policies sufficient to support a wrongful discharge claim in "all
sorts of unlikely places," which "[w]ithout the benefit of hindsight, [make] pre-
dicting where an employee will find a public policy exception [] difficult. ' ,6 For
example, the court has discovered substantial public policies supporting a
wrongful discharge claim in obscure state regulations governing barbers and
At-will employment is "[e]mployment that is usufally] undertaken without a contract and
that may be terminated at any time, by either the employer or the employee, without cause."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 430 (7th ed. 2000). For a discussion of the development of the at-will
employment rule in the United States and in West Virginia, see text and notes infra Part III.A.
2 See I HENRY H. PERRrr, JR., EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE 3 (4th ed. 1998);
see also, e.g., Deborah A. Ballam, Exploding the Original Myth Regarding Employment-At-Will:
The True Origins of the Doctrine, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 93 (1996) [hereinafter
Ballam, Exploding the Original Myth]; Deborah A. Ballam, The Development of the Employment
at Will Rule Revisited: A Challenge to Its Origins as Based in the Development of Advanced
Capitalism, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 75, 81 (1995) [hereinafter Ballam, Revisited]; Deborah A.
Ballam, The Traditional View on the Origins of the Employment-At-Will Doctrine: Myth or Real-
ity?, 33 AM. Bus. L.J. 1, 1 (1995) [hereinafter Ballam, Myth or Reality]; Arthur S. Leonard, A
New Common Law of Employment Termination, 66 N.C. L. REV. 631, 632 (1988); Henry H. Per-
ritt, Jr., The Future of Wrongful Dismissal Claims: Where Does Employer Self-Interest Lie?, 58
U. CIN. L. REV. 397, 397 (1989); Clyde W. Summers, Employment at Will in the United States:
The Divine Right of Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65, 70-73 (2000).
3 See 1 PERRITI, supra note 2, at 3. The public policy exception is also termed the "public
policy tort" or wrongful discharge based on violation of a public policy. See 2 id. at 3. The public
policy exception is discussed in detail infra Part III.B.
4 2 PERRITr, supra note 2, at 3.
5 In Harless v. First National Bank, when the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
adopted the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine, it used the term "substan-
tial public policy" in its holding. 246 S.E.2d 270, 275 (W. Va. 1978).
6 See Self-Defense: Another Blow to the At-Will Employment Doctrine, W. VA. EMP. L. LET-
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cosmetologists 7 and governing the licensure of hospitals.8 The court has even
used the substantial public policy exception to circumvent clear legislative intent
expressed in the West Virginia Human Rights Act. 9 This broad application of
the exception increases the attractiveness of the wrongful discharge claim for
newly terminated employees and creates uncertainty for employers trying to
make difficult personnel decisions.
This Comment generally discusses West Virginia's substantial public
policy jurisprudence, focusing on the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals'
decision in the case of Feliciano v. 7-Eleven, Inc.10 In response to a certified
question, the court in Feliciano established a substantial public policy exception
when an employee uses self-defense in response to a "lethal imminent dan-
ger," 1 thus adding the common-law right of self-defense to the growing list of
public policies supporting a wrongful discharge claim in the state.
This Comment asserts that the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
should not have adopted self-defense as a substantial public policy in Feliciano.
First, when viewed in light of the heroic nature of the events precipitating Fe-
liciano12 and the case's temporal proximity to the tragic events of September 11,
200 1,13 Feliciano represents the court creating a fact-specific, equitable remedy
in an attempt to preserve a cause of action for the plaintiff. Second, three other
jurisdictions had earlier considered the issue and expressly rejected self-defense
as a public policy exception; however, the Feliciano court eschewed the guid-
ance and reasoning of the cases from these other jurisdictions without any mean-
ingful analysis of their persuasive effect. 14
Feliciano leaves employers with little guidance when faced with an em-
ployee-employee altercation or an attack on an employee by a non-employee
because ultimately the state's courts must determine whether the employee actu-
ally faced the requisite "lethal imminent danger" needed to sustain a wrongful
discharge claim. The decision creates judicial second-guessing of employer
management decisions and conflicts with the other specific public policies ex-
pressed by the state legislature, principally those designed to protect employees
and the public. 5 Along with other recent public policy exception cases, 16 Fe-
7 See Syl. Pt. 5, Kanagy v. Fiesta Salons, Inc., 541 S.E.2d 616 (W. Va. 2000).
8 See Syl. Pt. 5, Tudor v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 506 S.E.2d 554 (W. Va. 1997).
9 See Syl. Pt. 8, Williamson v. Greene, 490 S.E.2d 23 (W. Va. 1997).
10 559 S.E.2d 713 (W. Va. 2001).
1 Id. at 716.
12 For a discussion of the facts from Feliciano, see infra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
13 On October 2, 2001, the case was submitted to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
for consideration. Id. at 713. The majority opinion by Justice Davis was filed on November 30,
2001. Id.
14 See infra Part V.B.2.
Is See infra Part V.A. 1-.2.
2004]
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liciano demonstrates that the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals is dis-
covering public policies in dubious places, therefore making it increasingly dif-
ficult for employers to predict when a terminated employee may find refuge
within the vast confines of the substantial public policy exception. Furthermore,
when read in combination with Blake v. John Skidmore Truck Stop, Inc. ,' 7 Fe-
liciano places employers, like 7-Eleven, in a potential catch-22: issue a nonre-
sistance policy,' 8 which invites problematic enforcement now that Feliciano
transforms any violation into a question of fact for a jury, or, after an employee
gets injured attempting to subdue a robber, be subjected to a deliberate intention
claim for failing to provide adequate security measures.
Part II of this Comment outlines Feliciano's factual and procedural his-
tory. Part III discusses the evolution and current state of both the at-will em-
ployment rule and the substantial public policy exception in the United States
and West Virginia. Part IV examines the analysis and reasoning of the Fe-
liciano majority while Part V presents several reasons why the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals should not have adopted self-defense as substantial
public policy exception to the at-will employment rule. Part V is divided into
two sections. The first section specifically addresses the negative ramifications
of Feliciano for employers, employees, the court system, and the public and
further demonstrates that self-defense as a public policy conflicts with other
clear legislative expressions of public policy, i.e., protecting employees and
protecting the public. The second section compares and contrasts Feliciano
with the out-of-jurisdiction cases the court labeled as supporting its position and
with those clearly rejecting self-defense as a public policy exception. Finally,
the Comment concludes in Part VI by connecting Feliciano's holding with the
court's decision in Blake,'9 discussing how together these two cases potentially
pose an additional dilemma for employers.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Antonio Feliciano ("Feliciano") was an at-will sales clerk at a 7-Eleven,
Inc. ("7-Eleven") store in Baker Heights, Berkeley County, West Virginia.2 ° In
the early morning of July 14, 2000, while Feliciano and several other employees
were working, a masked, armed female entered the store and demanded that the
employees give her the money.21 Several employees emptied the cash register.22
16 See infra notes 119-27 and accompany text.
'7 493 S.E.2d 887 (W. Va. 1997).
Is This is a policy that instructs employees to cooperate and not to interfere during robberies.
For a detailed discussion of these policies, see infra notes 93-94.
19 493 S.E.2d 887.
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Then, with the assailant focused on another employee, Feliciano grabbed and
disarmed her, thereafter subduing her until the local police arrived.2 3
To Feliciano's surprise, 7-Eleven - obviously unimpressed by his he-
roics - subsequently fired him, citing that he had not complied with a company
policy prohibiting employees from "subduing or otherwise interfering with a
store robbery. 24 Feliciano then filed a suit in Berkeley County Circuit Court,
alleging that 7-Eleven had wrongfully discharged him in contravention of a pub-
lic policy - "exercising his right to self-defense. 25
Seven-Eleven removed the suit to the United States District Court for
the Northern District of West Virginia and filed a motion to dismiss. 26 The dis-
trict court ruled that "'unless the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals holds
otherwise.... self-defense is not a substantial public policy in West Virginia,"'
which, if sustained, would have resulted in dismissal of Feliciano's case for fail-
ing to state a viable wrongful discharge claim. 27 However, the district court
certified a question to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals asking,
"Whether the right of self-defense is a 'substantial public policy' exception to
the at-will employment doctrine, which provides the basis for a discharge ac-
tion?" 28 The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals answered the question
affirmatively, recognizing an exception "whereby an employee may defend
him/herself against lethal imminent danger., 29 The court, nevertheless, quali-






27 Id. at 716-17 (citation omitted).
28 Id. at 716 (internal quotations omitted). The United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia certified this question pursuant to West Virginia Code section 51-1 A-3,
which provides in pertinent part:
The supreme court of appeals of West Virginia may answer a question of law
certified to it by any court of the United States ... if the answer may be de-
terminative of an issue in a pending cause in the certifying court and if there is
no controlling appellate decision, constitutional provision or statute of this
state.
W. VA. CODE § 5 1-IA-3 (2003). When considering a certified question from a federal district or
appellate court, the West Virginia Supreme Court "accord[s] the original court's determination
thereof plenary review" but applies a de novo standard of review to the legal issues presented the
question. Feliciano, 559 S.E.2d at 717 (citing Syl. Pt. 1, Light v. Allstate Ins. Co., 506 S.E.2d 64
(W. Va. 1998); Syl. Pt. 2, Aikens v. Debow, 541 S.E.2d 576 (W. Va. 2000)).
29 Feliciano, 559 S.E.2d at 716.
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by showing that the termination was based on "a plausible and legitimate busi-
ness reason."
30
Before deciding the issue, the court briefly reviewed the fundamental
principles of employment law germane to the case - the at-will employment
rule and the substantial public policy exception to the rule.31 Part III below
elaborates on the basic rules expressed in Feliciano, tracking the origins and
development of the at-will employment rule and the public policy exception to
the rule in both the United States and West Virginia.
III. BACKGROUND
A. At-Will Employment Rule
The modem formulation of the at-will employment rule is frequently at-
tributed to Horace Gray Wood's 1877 treatise on master and servant law32 al-
though the rule's true historical pedigree has been long a topic of scholarly de-
bate.33 In his Treatise on the Law of Master and Servant, Wood boldly pro-
30 Id.
31 Id. at 717-18.
32 See, e.g., LIONEL J. POSTIC, WRONGFUL TERMINATION: A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY, at xix
(1994) (citing H.G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER SERVANT (1877)); see also infra
articles cited in note 33.
33 Compare Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J.
LEGAL HIST. 118, 118, 131 (1976) (espousing the traditional view by arguing that, prior to Wood's
formulation of the rule, America followed the English presumption of a yearly hire and require-
ment of reasonable notice, but that in the late nineteenth century, the at-will rule developed in
America "in response to cases presented by a particular group of workers - middle managers" as
"an adjunct to the development of advanced capitalism in America") [hereinafter Feinman, Devel-
opment]; Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment-at-Will Rule Revisited, 23 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 733, 734 (1991) (responding to criticism of his 1976 article by reiterating his earlier thesis
and arguing that the at-will rule was not generally accepted when Wood wrote his treatise in 1877
but rather that the issue of duration of employment was in "flux") [hereinafter Feinman, Revis-
ited]; Sanford M. Jacoby, The Duration of Indefinite Employment Contracts in the United States
and England: An Historical Analysis, 5 COMP. LAB. L.J. 85, 112-13 (1982) (advancing the tradi-
tional view by agreeing that none of the cases cited by Wood supported his proposition but argu-
ing, however, that Wood did not say anything "radical" in expressing the at-will presumption but
did so in rejecting the annual hiring rule); Summers, supra note 2, at 67 (adopting the traditional
position and stating that the law was confused at time when Wood wrote treatise); and J. Peter
Shapiro & James F. Tune, Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335,
341-42 & n.54 (stating that none of the four cases Wood cited supported him and analyzing the
cases), with Ballam, Exploding the Original Myth, supra note 2, at 94-98 (overviewing the various
theories, performing a comprehensive analysis of state law, and criticizing Feinman, Jacoby, and
Morriss while concluding, like Freed and Polsby, that before Wood's treatise the at-will rule was
the "norm in the United States"); Ballam, Revisited, supra note 2, at 104-05 (challenging the
premise underlying Feinman's ultimate conclusion; concluding that he was wrong because from
colonial times to the nineteenth century New York law and historical evidence demonstrates that
the state had always followed the at-will rule); Ballam, Myth or Reality, supra note 2, at 47-50
(1995) (analyzing employment relationships and employment law developments from colonial
[Vol. 106
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claimed the doctrine of at-will employment as the unmistakable rule in Amer-
ica:
34
With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hir-
ing is prima facie a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to
make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to establish
it by proof. A hiring at so much a day, week, month, or year, no
time being specified, is an indefinite hiring, and no presumption
attaches that it was for a day even, but only at the rate fixed for
what time the party may serve .... [U]nless their understanding
was mutual that service was to extend for a certain fixed and
definite period, it is an indefinite hiring and is determinable at
the will of either party ....
Thus, under Wood's rule, an employee hired for an indefinite period was pre-
sumed to be at-will and therefore "could be fired for any reason or no reason at
all." 36
times to post-Civil was in Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, and Maryland and concluding
that the view that at-will rule suddenly was adopted in the late 1890s "appears to have been a
myth" because the at-will rule was always the standard in these states); Mayer G. Freed & Daniel
D. Polsby, The Doubtful Provenance of "Wood's Rule" Revisited, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 551, 551,
556-57 (1990) (arguing that, although some authorities have deemed "employment at-will . . . a
child of unrespectable pedigree, which lurched suddenly into existence in the late nineteenth cen-
tury," an examination of the cases Wood cited as support and several before his 1877 treatise
leave "little question ... that Wood was articulating an idea that was generally accepted"); and
Andrew P. Morriss, Exploding Myths: An Empirical and Economic Reassessment of the Rise of
Employment at-Will, 59 Mo. L. REV. 679, 762 (1994) (econometric analysis criticizing Feinman
and Jacoby's theses on the at-will rule and concluding that the rule "was not the product of Horace
Wood's mistaken analysis of the five cases, nor was it the result of the demands of the capitalist
class on their judicial minions" but rather the rule was adopted in the late 1800s by the judiciary as
a gatekeeping function "to evaluate evidence concerning performance by white collar, skilled
workers").
34 See, e.g., POSTIC, supra note 32, at xix; Feinman, Development, supra note 33, at 126;
Feinman, Revisited, supra note 33, at 735.
35 H.G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER SERVANT § 134, at 272 (1877).
36 2 MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 226 (2d ed. 1999); see Feliciano, 559
S.E.2d at 717-18 ("The practical effect of this doctrine, then, is that 'an at-will employee serves at
the will and pleasure of his or her employer and can be discharged at any time, with or without
cause."') (quoting Kanagy v. Fiesta Salons, Inc., 541 S.E.2d 16, 19 (W. Va. 2000)). See generally
I PERRITT, supra note 2, § 1.1-1.63 (overveiwng the at-will rule's evolution and origins of public
policy exception); PosTic, supra note 32, at xix-xxxvi (discussing the at-will doctrine and includ-
ing an exhaustive state-by-state survey of the at-will employment rule and the various limitations
applied in a table format); ROTHSTEIN, supra, § 8.1 (discussing briefly the at-will rule); Robert M.
Bastress, A Synthesis and a Proposal for Reform of the Employment At-Will Doctrine, 90 W. VA.
L. REV. 319, 319-21 (1988) (discussing the historical origin, application, and erosion of the at-will
employment rule); Parween Mascari, Note, What Constitutes a "Substantial Public Policy" in
West Virginia for Purposes of Retaliatory Discharge: Making a Mountain out of a Molehill, 105
W. VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004) (manuscript at 1-3, on file with law review); Note, Protecting
2004]
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Regardless of Wood's reasons for stating the at-will employment rule,37
it soon garnered widespread support in the United States, and as the twentieth
century neared, the idea that an employee was terminable-at-will was "the un-
questioned and central rule of employment law." 38 Eventually all states adopted
this rule39 and, currently, it applies in every state save Montana, which has
Employees At Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV.
1931, 1933-37 (1983); supra note 33 and articles cited therein (all discussing and debating the
historical origins of the at-will employment rule).
There are three important aspects to Wood's rule for employers: the employer can freely
impose conditions of employment, discharge employees for any reason at any time, and carryout
the discharge in any manner. MARK A. ROTHSTEIN & LANCE LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 30 (5th ed. 2003).
37 Fieman criticizes Wood for his inadequate explanation and lack of support for his formula-
tion of the rule:
First, the four American cases he cited in support of the rule were in fact far
off the mark. Second, his scholarly disingenuity was extraordinary; he stated
incorrectly that no American courts in recent years had approved the English
rule, that the employment at will rule was inflexibly applied in the United
States, and that the English rule was only for a yearly hiring, making no men-
tion of notice. Third, in the absence of valid legal support, Wood offered no
policy grounds for the rule he proclaimed.
Feinman, Development, supra note 33, at 126 (footnotes omitted); see also POSTIC, supra note 32,
at xix (noting that this formation of the law was contrary to an 1816 treatise on the employment
law, but Wood's treatise did not even reference the earlier work and adding that the cases cited in
Wood's 1877 treatise as support for his rule "in fact provide no support for the doctrine"). How-
ever, other commentators have concluded that the cases Wood relied on "notwithstanding the
persistent assertions to the contrary, . . do indeed support the principle for which Wood cited
them" and that the cases provide "ample support for Wood's rule." Freed & Polsby, supra note
33, at 554; see Morriss, supra note 33, at 762 (concluding that the at-will rule "was not the prod-
uct of Horace Wood's mistaken analysis of five cases"). But see Feinman, Revisited, supra note
33, at 736-39 (disagreeing with Freed and Polsby's analysis of the cases and regarding Wood's
rule "as an innovation, unsupported in its definitive terms, which had influence in ridifying a
previously fluid body of law"). Another commentator has concluded that there is "substantial
support for the proposition that the United States always has followed the employment-at-will
doctrine .... [Therefore,] [i]t is now time to put to rest the original myth surrounding employ-
ment-at-will, that it was a creation of treatise writer Horace Wood, readily adopted by late nine-
teenth century jurists intent on protecting the new industrial order." Ballam, Exploding the Origi-
nal Myth, supra note 2, at 130.
38 ROTHSTEIN ET AL, supra note 36, at 226. For a discussion of the expansion of the at-will
employment rule after Wood's proclamation of it, see generally Jacoby, supra note 33, at 113-16;
Shapiro & Tune, supra note 33, at 343-347. For a detailed study of how and when states adopted
the at-will employment rule, see generally Morriss, supra note 33.
39 "In the realm of the employer-employee relationship, West Virginia is an 'at-will' jurisdic-
tion." Cook v. Heck's Inc., 342 S.E.2d 453, 457 (W. Va. 1986) (citing Wright v. Standard Ultra-
marine & Color Co., 90 S.E.2d 459 (W. Va. 1955)). West Virginia first adopted the at-will rule in
1913. See Syl. Pt.1, Resener v. Watts, Ritter & Co., 80 S.E. 839 (W. Va. 1913) ("An employment
upon a monthly or annual salary, if no definite period is otherwise stated or proved for its continu-
ance, is presumed to be a hiring at-will, which either party may at any time determine at his pleas-
ure without liability for breach of contract."). Although acknowledging that the authorities were
[Vol. 106
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adopted a statute limiting termination to just cause.40 The at-will employment
rule thrived virtually uncontested through the initial half of the twentieth cen-
tury.
a1
Nevertheless, the discretion afforded an employer in terminating at-will
employees is no longer absolute.4 2 During the first quarter of the twentieth cen-
tury, legislatures and courts around the country implemented strategies, e.g.
constitutional restrictions,4 3 statutory restrictions, an and various common-law,
"not wholly in accord," the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Resener observed that
"[t]he doctrine applied by the great majority of the courts, which have so far [by 1913] expressed
an opinion on the subject, consists essentially in a complete repudiation of the presumption that a
general or indefinite hiring was for a year, and the substitution of another presumption, viz., that
such a hiring is a hiring at-will." Id. at 840. In addition to relying on a number of cases from
other jurisdictions the court also quoted the famous language from Wood's treatise. See id. (citing
WOOD, supra note 35, § 136 [sic]). In Bell v. South Penn Natural Gas Co., the court further clari-
fied that "an employment, unaffected by contractual or statutory provisions to the contrary, may
be terminated, with or without cause, at the will of either party .... When the contract of employ-
ment is of indefinite duration it may be terminated at any time by either party." 62 S.E.2d 285,
288 (W. Va. 1950) (citations omitted). For other West Virginia cases stating the at-will rule, see,
for example, Feliciano, 559 S.E.2d at 717-18; Bine v. Owens, 542 S.E.2d 842, 845 (W. Va. 2000)
(per curiam); Hogue v. Cecil I. Walker Mach. Co., 431 S.E.2d 687, 689 (W. Va. 1993); Mace v.
Charleston Area Med. Ctr. Found., 422 S.E.2d 624, 629 (W. Va. 1993); Suter v. Harsco Corp.,
403 S.E. 2d. 751, 754 (W. Va. 1991); Shanholtz v. Monongahela Power Co., 270 S.E.2d 178, 181
(W. Va. 1980); see also Mascari, surpra note 36 (manuscript at 1-3); Francesa Tan, Cook v.
Heck's: Erosion of Employment at Will in West Virginia, 89 W. VA. L. REV. 379 (1987).
40 See POSTic, supra note 32, at xix.; ROTHSTEIN & LIEBMAN, supra note 36, at 999. In 1987,
Montana enacted the Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act, MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901
to -915 (2003), which includes as elements of a wrongful discharge claim that "the discharge was
not for good cause and the employee had completed the employer's probationary period of em-
ployment." Id. § 39-2-904(l)(b); see Meech v. Hillhaven West, Inc., 776 P.2d 488 (Mont. 1989)
(upholding the constitutionality of the Act under a challenge that it violated the right of "full legal
redress" within the meaning of Article II, § 16 of the Montana Constitution).
41 ROTHSTEIN ET AL, supra note 36, at 227. Although long ago reputed by the United States
Supreme Court, see NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), the right of em-
ployers to terminate at-will was essentially "transmuted into a constitutional right" during the
early twentieth century. Clyde W. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal:
Timefora Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481, 485 (1976); see Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 174-
75 (1908) (holding that the "right of the employe[e] to quit the service of the employer, for what-
ever, reason, is the same as the right of the employer, for whatever reason, to dispense with the
services of such employe[e]"), overruled by NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. I
(1937); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 17 (1915).
42 See Feliciano, 559 S.E.2d at 718 (quoting Kanagy v. Fiesta Salons, Inc., 541 S.E.2d 616,
623 (W.Va. 2000)). See generally I PERRITr, supra note 2, §§ 2.1-6.78; 2 id. §§ 7.1-8.26 (dis-
cussing various limits on at-will employment rule); POSTIC, supra note 32, at xxiv-xxxvi (discuss-
ing the various limitations applied by each respective state); ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 36, at
33-131; Bastress, supra note 36, at 319-41 (discussing the limits on the at-will employment rule).
43 Bastress, supra note 36, at 325-26. Especially in public employment, state and federal
constitutional developments have limited the scope of the at-will employment rule. See id. Em-
ployees cannot be discharged for exercising freedom of speech or freedom of association rights;
for their political affiliation; or for their race, gender, national origin, alienage, or religion or when
the termination has violated some substantive due process right. Id.
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contract-based theories,45 designed to curtail the perceived harsh, inflexibility of
Wood's rule.4 6  Additionally, "[tihe most common widely-accepted common
44 Bastress, supra note 36, at 321-25 (noting the importance of statutes permitting collective
bargaining and unionization; the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169; Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e; West Virginia Human Rights Act, W. VA. CODE §§ 5-1 1-3, -9; and various
fair employment, worker's compensation, wage and hours, occupational safety, and pension stat-
utes that prohibit retaliatory discharge for invoking rights under them); see also PERRITr, supra
note 2 (volumes one and two discussing in detail the statutory limitations on the at-will rule, in-
cluding the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2000)); ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra
note 36 (discussing these same statutory limitations in volumes one and two); Mascari, supra note
36 (manuscript at 7-9, discussing federal and West Virginia statutory exemptions).
45 Bastress, supra note 36, at 335-40 (discussing some courts' willingness to enforce oral
promises and finding exceptions to the Statute of Frauds, apply promissory estoppel, enforce
provisions of employer handbooks and policies as creating a contract, and, most importantly, find
exceptions based on a breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing); see also I PERRITr,
supra note 2, at 319-511 (discussing in detail the various contract theories); ROTSTEIN Er AL.,
supra note 36 (same); Leonard, supra note 2, at 647-57 (same); Perritt, supra note 2, at 398-99
(same); Mascari, supra note 36 (manuscript at 5-7 noting same).
46 Commentator Richard Epstein argues that "[tihe judicial erosion of the older position has
been spurred on by academic commentators, who have been almost unanimous in their condemna-
tion of the at-will relationship, often treating it as an archaic relic that should be jettisoned along
with other vestiges of the nineteenth-century laissez-faire." Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the
Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947, 948 & n.4 (1984). He further maintains that the view
that "the contract at will has outlived its usefulness ... is mistaken," id. at 951, because
"[c]ontracts at will are consistent with public policy and should be welcomed by it, not because
they are perfect, but because in many contexts they respond to the manifold perils of employment
contracts better than any rivals that courts or legislatures can devise." Id. at 952. According to
Epstein,
The recent efforts to undermine or abolish the contract at will should be evaluated not
in terms of what they hope to achieve, whether stated in terms of worker participation,
industrial harmony, fundamental fairness, or enlightened employment relations. In-
stead, they should be evaluated for the generally harsh results that they actually pro-
duce. They introduce an enormous amount of undesirable complexity into the law of
employment relations; they increase the frequency of civil litigation; and over the
broad run of cases they work to the disadvantage of both the employers and the em-
ployees whose conduct they govern.
Id. at 953. In sum, "[n]o system of regulation can hope to match the benefits that the contract at
will affords in employment relations." Id. at 982. However, not all commentators are as optimis-
tic about the virtues of the at-will employment rule as Epstein. For criticisms of the rule, see, for
example, Lawrence E. Blades, Employment At Will Vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967), arguing for establishment
of "abusive" discharge claim based in tort to limit the absolute dominion the outmoded at-will rule
provides employers over employees and arguing that the policy justifications for the rule no
longer justify the right to discharge at-will and employer overrreaching; Leonard, supra note 2, at
671-74, arguing for courts to abandon the at-will rule in face of legislative apathy and providing
three reasons for doing so: (1) "consistency with the overall substance of contemporary employ-
ment law," (2) "economics," and (3) "fairness consistent with contemporary concepts of equality
and human rights"; Summers, supra note 2, lamenting that that the at-will rule has survived and
terming it the "divine right" of employers; Summers, supra note 41, arguing for total abandon-
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law exception... imposes liability on an employer who discharges a worker for
reasons that contravene a substantial public policy.
'47
These subsequent qualifications have transformed the at-will employ-
ment rule from a blanket presumption into a crazy quilt of limitations and ex-
ceptions. As one commentator has observed, the traditional at-will rule "has
been qualified in so many ways that only bad luck prevents an unjustly dis-
charged employee from fitting his termination into squares that could provide
relief. It is the employer's poor luck if the employee's allegations fall into a
category that allows him tort damages. '48 Since the question before the Fe-
liciano court only concerned the substantial public policy exception, the follow-
ing section focuses only on that exception, outlining its adoption in West Vir-
ginia and development of its governing principles.
B. Substantial Public Policy Exception to the At-Will Employment Rule
In 1959, the California Court of Appeals created the first "judicial
chink" in the collective armor of the at-will employment doctrine when it
adopted the public policy exception in Petermann v. International Brotherhood
of Teamsters.4 9 In 1978, highlighting the national trend spurred by Petermann,5°
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals first recognized the substantial
public policy exception in Harless v. First National Bank.5 1
ment of the at-will rule and the development of a statutory scheme protecting rights of employees
from arbitrary and unjust dismissal.
47 Bastress, supra note 36, at 326; see also Protecting Employees, supra note 36, at 1931-36.
See generally 2 PERRITT, supra note 2, at 1-126 (thoroughly discussing the public policy exception
and its application; includes case annotations); ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 36, at 68-81 (dis-
cussing the general application of the exception and the four general categories in which the vari-
ous exceptions usually fall under); Mascari, supra note 36 (manuscript at 9-11, 16-29).
48 Bastress, supra note 36, at 319-20.
49 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (holding that right to fire an at-will employee could be
limited by either statute or public policy). The public policy exception is recognized in the major-
ity of jurisdictions in the United States. 2 PERRITr, supra note 2, at 3; POSTIC, supra note 32, at
xix-xx. Actually, only six states have considered the public policy exception and rejected it:
Alabama, see Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hosp., 352 So. 2d 1130, 1131-32 (Ala. 1977); Florida, see
Smith v. Piezo Tech. & Prof'l Admin., 427 So. 2d 182, 184 (Fla. 1983); Georgia, see Goodroe v.
Ga. Power Co., 252 S.E.2d 51, 52 (Ga. Ct. App. 1978); Louisiana, see Tolliver v. Concordia Wa-
terworks Dist. No. 1, 735 So. 2d 680, 682 (La. Ct. App. 1999); New York, see Murphy v. Am.
Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 89-90 (N.Y. 1983); and Rhode Island, see Pacheco v. Ray-
theon Co., 623 A.2d 464, 465 (R.I. 1993) (per curiam). Additionally, courts in Nebraska have not
had the opportunity to consider the issue. See I PERRITI, supra note 2, at 24-61 (citing public
policy cases state-by-state); POSTIC, supra note 32, at xxiv-xxxvi (doing a state-by-state analysis
in table format); ROTHSTEIN ET AL., supra note 36, at 261-62 (listing the same states). Arizona has
legislatively codified its at-will rule and public policy exception. See Arizona Employment Pro-
tection Act, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23-1501 (West Supp. 2003).
so See Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270, 273-75 (W. Va. 1978).
51 246 S.E.2d 270. For a discussion of Harless and the development of the public policy ex-
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In Harless, the plaintiff, Harless, the office manager of First National
Bank's consumer credit department, allegedly told the upper management that
the bank was intentionally and illegally engaging in conduct that violated fed-
eral and state consumer credit and protection laws. 52  Several months later,
Harless was summarily fired after he reported the violations to the bank's audi-
tor and presented the auditor with incriminating files, which Harless had re-
trieved from the trash.53 Consequently, Harless filed a suit, arguing that his ter-
mination violated a public policy embodied by the state Consumer Credit and
Protection Act. 4 Responding to a certified question, the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals held that "the rule giving the employer the absolute right to
discharge an at-will employee must be tempered by the further principle that
where the employer's motivation for the discharge contravenes some substantial
public policy principle, then the employer may be liable to the employee for
damages occasioned by the discharge.
55
Since Harless, West Virginia's substantial public policy exception ju-
risprudence - mirroring the national development - has focused on four rough
categories of protected employee conduct: when an employee (1) exercises a
valuable right; 56 (2) performs a valuable public service;57 (3) exposes or com-
plains about employer wrongdoing; 58 or (4) refuses to engage in unlawful or
ception in West Virginia, see generally Mascari, supra note 36 (manuscript at 11-41).
52 Harless, 246 S.E.2d at 272.
53 Id. at 272-73.
5 Id. at 275. The West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act is currently codified at
W. VA. CODE §§ 46A- 1-101 to 46A-8-102 (2003).
55 Harless, 246 S.E.2d at 275. The West Virginia Court of Appeals has further added that
"one of the fundamental rights of an employee is a right not to be the victim of a retaliatory dis-
charge, that is, a discharge from employment where the employer's motivation for the discharge is
in contravention of a substantial public policy." Feliciano v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 559 S.E.2d 713, 718
(W. Va 2001) (quoting Kanagy v. Fiesta Salons, Inc., 541 S.E. 2d 616, 620 (W. Va. 2000) (cita-
tions omitted)).
56 See, e.g., Mace v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr. Found, 422 S.E.2d 624 (W. Va. 1992) (rights
under Veteran's Reemployment Rights Act); Twigg v. Hercules Corp., 406 S.E.2d 52 (W. Va.
1990) (holding right to privacy provides right to refuse to take drug test when the test is not based
upon reasonable suspicion or the employee's job does not involve public safety); McClung v.
Marion County Comm'n, 360 S.E.2d 221 (W. Va. 1987) (right to petition for redress of griev-
ances and seek access to courts by filing action for overtime wages); Cordle v. General Hugh
Mercer Corp., 325 S.E.2d IIl (W. Va. 1984) (right to privacy encompasses right to refuse to take
polygraph test); Shanholtz v. Monogahela Power Co., 270 S.E.2d 178 (W. Va. 1980) (right to file
worker's compensation claims).
57 See, e.g., Page v. Columbia Natural Res., 480 S.E.2d 817 (W. Va. 1996) (testifying truth-
fully in a legal action).
58 See, e.g., Kanagy, 541 S.E.2d 616 (providing truthful information to investigator concerning
employer regulatory violations); Tudor v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 506 S.E.2d 554 (W.
Va. 1997); Slack v. Kanawha County Hous. & Redevel. Auth., 423 S.E.2d 547 (W. Va. 1992)
(informing federal prosecutors of improprieties in operation of housing authority); Collins v.
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unethical conduct.5 9 These categories, although "not wholly distinct," generally
demonstrate the nature of employee conduct protected from employer retalia-
tion.6 °
Since individual states have established their own lists of derivative
sources, the key issue in determining whether an employee's termination has
triggered some substantial public policy is not always clear because defining
what constitutes a public policy is problematic. One court has termed this "the
Achilles heel" of the public policy exception. 61 As noted by the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals, "the outlines of public policy are elusive, describing
the concept as nebulous and hard to define. 62  According to commentators,
across the states "[t]here is a spectrum of opinions regarding the proper bases
for identifying 'public policies.'
', 63
Elkay Mining Co., 371 S.E.2d 46 (W. Va 1988) (refusing to falsify safety reports concerning mine
safety inspection); Wiggins v. E. Associated Coal Corp., 357 S.E.2d 745 (W. Va. 1987); Harless,
246 S.E.2d 270 (attempting to force employer to comply with consumer credit protection laws).
59 See, e.g., Lilly v. Overnight Transp. Co., 425 S.E.2d 214 (W. Va. 1992) (refusing to operate
a motor vehicle with unsafe brakes).
60 Bastress, supra note 36, at 326 (identifying and discussing cases from West Virginia and
other jurisdictions fitting into each of the four categories); see also Gardner v. Loomis Armored
Inc., 913 P.2d 377, 379 (Wash. 1996) (identifying the same four categories); ROTHSTEIN ET AL.,
supra note 36, at 261-79 (framing the four categories as (1) refusing to perform unlawful acts, (2)
reporting illegal activity (whistleblowing), (3) exercising legal rights, and (4) performing public
duties); Sandra S. Park, Working Towards Freedom from Abuse: Recognizing a "Public Policy"
Exception to the Employment-At- Will for Domestic Violence Victims, 59 ANN. SURv. AM. L. 121,
134 (2003) (outlining categories as "(1) discharges for refusing to violate criminal or civil laws;
(2) discharges for satisfying legal or civic obligations; (3) discharges for exercising statutory of
constitutional rights or privileges; and (4) discharges for reasons deemed repugnant to public
policy"); cf Mascari, supra note 36 (manuscript at 17-29, categorizing cases by sources of public
policy: the West Virginia and United States Constitution, federal and state statutes, the common
law, administrative regulations, and other reasons).
61 Palmateer v. Int'l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (I11. 1981).
62 Wounaris v. W. Va. State Coll., 588 S.E.2d 406, 412 (W. Va. 2003) (per curiam) (citations
and quotations omitted); see Mascari, supra note 36 (manuscript at 16, indicating that what consti-
tutes a substantial public policy is hard to define).
63 Bastress, supra note 36, at 331. The narrowest form of the public policy exception requires
that the policy be derived from clear and specific legislation designed to protect employees and, to
state a claim, the plaintiff must show the employer contravened some specific part of that legisla-
tion. See id. However, courts adopting a more expansive view of public policy have taken one or
more of the following steps:
(1) Extended the kinds of state interests to be vindicated from only those pro-
tecting workers to include general concerns regarding public health, safety,
welfare, morals, etc.; (2) Derived public policies not only from specific legis-
lative provisions but also from broadly stated legislative goals; and (3) Ex-
panded the sources for identifying public policies beyond those stated in legis-
lation to include administrative regulations and executive rules, codes of eth-
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In general, however, "[p]ublic policy is that principle of law which
holds that no person can lawfully do that which has a tendency to be injurious to
the public or against public good even though no actual injury may have re-
sulted therefrom in a particular case to the public." 64 The substantial public
policy exceptions "were created to protect the public from threats to its health,
financial well-being, or constitutional rights, or to guarantee the effective opera-
tion of the legal system. The rationale underlying each exception is that protect-
ing the employee from discharge is necessary to uphold a substantial public in-
terest.,
65
In West Virginia, the courts look to "established precepts in our consti-
tution, legislative enactments, legislatively approved regulations, and judicial
opinions" to identify sources of substantial public policies. 66 But, "[i]nherent in
the term 'substantial public policy' is the concept that the policy will provide
specific guidance to a reasonable person." 67 Furthermore, "'substantial public
policy' implies that the policy will be clearly recognized simply because it is
substantial. An employer should not be exposed to liability where a public pol-
Id.
According to Professor Perritt's book, Employee Dismissal Law and Practice, the clarity
element, that is, finding a public policy clear enough to support a wrongful discharge claim, can
be satisfied in four basic ways, with diminishing effectiveness as one descends the hierarchy:
1. By identifying a specific provision of a statute, constitution, or adminis-
trative regulation ....
2. By synthesizing from several different statutes or constitutional provi-
sions ....
3. By identifying a right or mode of conduct covered by the traditional com-
mon law cause of action ....
4. By identifying a well-recognized professional standard of trade practice.
2 PERRITr, supra note 2, at 21.
64 Feliciano v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 559 S.E.2d 713, 718 (W. Va. 2001) (quoting Cordle v. General
Hugh Mercer Corp., 325 S.E.2d 11!, 114 (W. Va. 1984) (citations and quotations omitted)).
65 Id. at 724 (Maynard, J., dissenting).
66 Birthisel v. Tri-Cities Health Serv. Corp., 424 S.E.2d 606, 612 (W. Va. 1992). But see
Wounaris v. W. Va. State Coll., 588 S.E.2d 406, 413 (W. Va. 2003) (per curiam) (indicating that
the court "sometimes struggle[s] with just what constitutes a substantial public policy issue that
would prevent an at-will employee from being fired"). In West Virginia, there was no precise
answer as to what constituted a substantial public policy principle until Birthisel. The standard for
defining the sources of substantial public policies prior to Birthisel was quoted with approval from
Allen v. Commercial Causalty & Insurance Co., 37 A.2d 37 (N. J. 1944), which set forth the fol-
lowing broad sources: "among others, our federal and state constitutions, our public statutes, our
judicial decisions, the applicable principles of the common law, the acknowledged prevailing
concepts of the federal and states governments relating to and affecting the safety, health, morals
and general welfare of the people." Birthisel, 424 S.E.2d at 611 (quoting Cordle v. General Hugh
Mercer Corp., 325 S.E.2d I 11, 114 (W. Va. 1984)) (quotations omitted).
67 Birthisel, 424 S.E.2d at 612.
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icy standard is too general to provide any specific guidance or is so vague that it
is subject to different interpretations." 68 Therefore, to be substantial, a public
policy must not only be recognizable as such but also "must be so widely re-
garded as to be evident to employers and employees alike. 69 In Feliciano, the
United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia's certi-
fied question provided the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals an oppor-
tunity to decide whether the common-law right of self-defense fit within this
public policy exception rubric.7°
IV. FELICIANO MAJORITY OPINION
Writing for the majority, Justice Davis answered the certified question
affirmatively, holding that, when an at-will employee has been fired after exer-
cising self-defense in response to a "lethal imminent danger," the right to use
self-defense represents a substantial public policy exception to the at-will em-
ployment rule and thus can be used as a basis for a wrongful discharge claim.
71
Nevertheless, the majority added that the employer may rebut the wrongful dis-
charge presumption by a showing that the termination was based "upon a plau-
sible and legitimate business reason." 72
The majority initially noted that, in West Virginia, determining whether
a public policy exists is a question of law.73 Then, after a cursory overview of
the at-will employment principles74 and the basics of the substantial public pol-
icy exception, 75 the court probed the relevant sources 76 seeking a clear expres-
sion of self-defense as a substantial public policy. No such expression was
found in either the West Virginia Constitution or the state's statutes. 77 How-
ever, the majority gave much credence to the state's jurisprudential history, ex-
plaining that "[it] clearly demonstrates the existence of a public policy favoring
an individual's right to defend him/herself.,
78
68 Id. at 613.
69 Feliciano, 559 S.E.2d at 718.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 722-23.
72 Id. at 724.
73 See id. at 717 (citing Cordle v. General Hugh Mercer Corp., 325 S.E.2d II1 (W. Va. 1984)).
74 See id. at 717-18. For a detailed discussion of the at-will employment rule in West Virginia,
see supra note 39.
75 See id. at 718. For a detailed discussion of the public policy exception in West Virginia, see
supra Part III.B.
76 See text accompanying note 66.
77 See Feliciano, 559 S.E.2d at 718-19.
78 Id. at 719.
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After an extensive and detailed analysis of the nature of self-defense,
the circumstances in which self-defense can be used, and the procedural rules
governing self-defense as an affirmative defense in West Virginia,79 the court
stated that West Virginia has previously "recognized that the right to self-
defense extends to one's place of employment." 80 Thus, to the majority, "it
[went] without saying that an individual's right to self-defense in West Virginia
has been sufficiently established in and clarified by our State's common law so
as to render it a substantial public policy."
8'
Noting that employers also have a duty to protect their customers and
employees, the court, attempting to balance this duty with the employee's right
to use self-defense, held that the employee's right "must necessarily be limited
in its scope and available in only the most dangerous of circumstances," that is,
"in response to lethal imminent danger."82 The court established that the em-
ployer can rebut the presumption of wrongful discharge "by demonstrating that
it had a plausible and legitimate business reason for terminating its employee.1
83
The court concluded its opinion by adopting a new four-element test for
a wrongful discharge action "as guidance for future cases": 84
(1) [Whether a] clear public policy existed and was manifested
in a state or federal constitution, statute or administrative regu-
lation, or in the common law (the clarity element). (2)
[Whether] dismissing employees under circumstances like those
involved in the plaintiff's dismissal would jeopardize the public
policy (the jeopardy element). (3) [Whether t]he plaintiff's dis-
missal was motivated by conduct related to the public policy
(the causation element). (4) [Whether t]he employer lacked
79 Id. The court used a self-defense definition from State v. Hughes: "A defendant who is not
the aggressor and has reasonable grounds to believe, and actually does believe, that he is in immi-
nent danger of death or serious bodily harm from which he could save himself only by using
deadly force against his assailant has the right to employ deadly force in order to defend himself."
476 S.E.2d 189, 195 (W. Va. 1996) (citation omitted). See generally Feliciano, 559 S.E.2d at 719
(discussing other general definitions from West Virginia cases in footnote six, West Virginia cases
concerning the reasonableness standard in footnote seven, West Virginia cases defining circum-
stances in which a person may claim self-defense in footnote eight, and the various procedural
rules that govern assertion of self-defense as an affirmative defense in footnote nine).
80 Feliciano, 559 S.E.2d at 722 (quoting Syl Pt. 7, State v. Laura, 116 S.E. 251 (W. Va. 1923)
("[I]n defending himself, his family or his property from the assault of an intruder, one is not
limited to his immediate home or castle; his right to stand his ground in defense thereof without
retreating extends to his place of business also and where it is necessary he may take the life of his
assailant or intruder.")).
81 Id. at 722.
82 Id. at 722-23.
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overriding legitimate business justification for the dismissal (the
overriding justification element).85
V. WHY SELF-DEFENSE SHOULD NOT CONSTITUTE A SUBSTANTIAL PUBLIC
POLICY EXCEPTION
A. Negative Consequences of Feliciano
1. Increases Risk to Public and Conflicts with Other Expressions
of Public Policy
In his dissent, Justice Maynard asserted that the self-defense public pol-
icy exception could do "more harm than good. 86 Probably, one of the most
frequent instances where an employee would face a "lethal imminent danger"
would be in the context of an armed robbery of a gas station or convenience
store.87 Although nothing in Feliciano specifically prohibits these businesses
85 Id. at 723 (citing Godfredson v. Hess & Clark, Inc., 173 F.3d 365 (6th Cir. 1999)); see also
Gardner v. Loomis Armored Inc., 913 P.2d 377, 382 (Wash. 1996) (adopting same elements). In
the court's opinion, this "succinct summation merely reiterates" the previous procedures that had
been applied by West Virginia courts. Feliciano, 559 S.E.2d at 723. Prior to Feliciano, the
scheme of proof required for a wrongful discharge action was as set forth in Page v. Columbia
Natural Resources, Inc.:
[O]nce the plaintiff in an action for wrongful discharge based upon the con-
travention of a substantial public policy has established the existence of such
policy and established by a preponderance of the evidence that an employment
discharge was motivated by an unlawful factor contravening that policy, li-
ability will then be imposed on a defendant unless the defendant proves by a
preponderance of the evidence that the same result would have occurred even
in the absence of the unlawful motive.
480 S.E.2d 817, 829 (W. Va. 1996).
The origin of the four-element test adopted in Feliciano and cited in Godfredson and Gard-
ner can be traced to Professor Perritt's book, Employee Dismissal Law and Practice. See 2
PERRITT, supra note 2, at 4-5. In Godfredson, the court cited Kulch v. Structural Fibers, Inc., 677
N.E.2d 308, 321 (Ohio 1997), as the source of its authority for the test. Godfredson, 173 F.3d at
375. In turn, Kulch cited a law review article written by Professor Perritt that was partially based
on his book. Kulch, 677 N.E.2d at 321; see Perritt, supra note 2. In Employee Dismissal Law and
Practice, Professor Perritt discusses the ins and outs of the four-prong test, including how to ap-
proach the individual analysis under each element, and also lists cases from other jurisdictions
demonstrating how the analytical framework operates. Perritt's book may provide a good ba-
rometer of how the test will be applied in West Virginia.
86 Feliciano, 559 S.E.2d at 725 (Maynard, J., dissenting).
87 "The rate of work-related homicides exceeded 10 times the national average for gas station
attendants, sales counter clerks, and police and detectives in the public sector .. " GuY TOSCANO
& WILLIAM WEBER, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, VIOLENCE IN THE WORKPLACE 44 (1994),
http://stats.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/cfarOO05.pdf. "Workers in retail establishments, such as convenience
stores, retail groceries, and restaurants ... account for about half of all homicides, but make up
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from issuing policies advocating non-resistance during robberies, the decision
does afford employees the discretion to "take justice into their own hands" in-
stead of obeying the employer's policy. Should the employee choose to assert
his right to self-defense under these circumstances, there is a high probability
that the employee, other employees, or innocent patrons will be injured in the
ensuing melre.88 Therefore, even though volumes of case law recognize the
common-law right to self-defense, the employer's interest in being able to en-
force a policy like 7-Eleven's - designed to protect the safety and welfare of its
employees and the general public - should be given greater deference than this
individual right. 89
Additionally, recognizing self-defense as a public policy exception con-
flicts with other clear expressions of public policy promulgated by the West
Virginia Legislature that emphasize protecting the safety and welfare of the pub-
lic and employees. First, the purpose statement of the Convenience Food Stores
only a sixth of the Nation's work force." Id. In terms of occupation and industry, the workers
most likely to be robbery-homicide victims are those who engaged in cash transactions, work
alone or in small numbers, work in high-crime areas, sell or guard valuables, work at locations
with few people and easy escape routes. See ERIC SYGNATUR & Guy A. ToSCANO, U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, WORK-RELATED HOMICIDES: THE FACTS, COMPENSATION AND WORKING CONDITIONS 3, 4
(2000) ("Occupations that fit these characteristics are diverse, from managers to sales workers,
guards to taxi-cab drivers."), http:l/www.bls.gov/opub/cwc/archivelspring2OOOartl.pdf.
According to a 1995 Bureau of Labor Statistics report, one out of every six (1,024) of the
6,210 work-related fatalities was the result of a homicide, making it the second leading cause of
job-related death. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, CFOI 96-2, JOB-
RELATED HOMICIDE PROFILED (1996), http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/cfoi/cftbOO65.pdf. Addition-
ally, "[m]ost of the workplace homicides appear to result from robberies or robbery-attempts.
Typically, these robberies involved store personnel, gas station attendants, or taxicab drivers being
shot for cash receipts." Id. Also in 1998, homicides accounted for 12% of the 6,026 work-related
fatalities and of the 428 homicides where the victim-assailant relationship could be identified,
two-thirds involved robbery. SYGNATUR & TOSCANO, supra, at 3. Therefore, in the 1992-1998
period, robbery accounted for 68% of the homicides in which the victim-assailant association was
identifiable. Id. at 4. The National Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries in 2000 revealed work-
place homicides increased for the first time since 1994, see BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF LABOR, USDL 01-261, NATIONAL CENSUS OF FATAL OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES IN 2000, at
1 (2001), http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/cfoi/cfnr007.pdf, and that robbery was again the primary
motive for work-place homicides. See ROSEMARY J. ERICKSON, ATHENA RESEARCH CORP.,
SELECTED SUMMARY OF BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS REPORT ON WORKPLACE VIOLENCE IN 2000,
at 1, 2 (2001). According to the same report, grocery store homicides, which includes convenience
stores, saw a 42% increase in 2000. Id.
88 See infra note 93.
89 Cf. Escalante v. Wilson's Art Studio, Inc., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 187, 193 (Ct. App. 2003) ("Not
every right guaranteed to citizens by statute, or even the Constitution, is one which society has a
rooting interest in seeing exercised. For example, the right of privacy ... includes a woman's
fight to have an abortion .... But that does not mean society is encouraging abortion. Instead, it
is merely allowing the decision to be made by individuals, according to their own interests.").
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Safety Act ("Act")90 clearly evidences a strong public policy in favor of protect-
ing the welfare of employees and customers:
The Legislature finds that it is necessary to the safety, health,
public interest and general welfare of the people of the state of
West Virginia that convenience food stores operating in the
state be regulated to prevent the ever-present danger to the
safety, health, life and general welfare of its citizens and the
employees of these stores.91
Included in the Act are provisions for robbery prevention training and develop-
ment of written robbery prevention programs to aid in achieving this purpose.
92
Robbery prevention policies, like the one 7-Eleven enforced against Feliciano,
usually instruct employees not to confront or resist attempted robberies.93 These
policies are based on the statistically proven premise that a clerk is less likely to
be murdered if he or she cooperates with and appeases the assailant rather than
attempts to thwart the robbery.94  Therefore, it is clear that policies like 7-
90 W. VA. CODE §§ 21-13-1 to -5 (2003).
91 Id. § 21-13-1 (Purpose).
92 Id. § 21-13-3(4) ("Any owner or employee who works between the hours of twelve o'clock
a.m. and five o'clock a.m. at a convenience food store shall be trained in robbery prevention by
the owner. Owners shall develop a written robbery prevention program which shall be available
for inspection during regular business hours at each convenient food store, and shall base the
training on the program.").
93 Seven-Eleven's non-resistance policy at issue in Feliciano is just one aspect of a broader
robbery and violence prevention program. Its current program is based on a data from several
research studies. See Rosemary J. Erickson & Arnie Stenseth, Crimes of Convenience, SECURITY
MGMT., Oct. 1996, at 60, 60. First, in the 1970s, the Southland Corporation, which owned and
operated 7-Eleven stores, funded research by the National Institute of Justice Western Behavioral
Sciences Institute ("WBSI"). Id. WBSI, using 7-Eleven stores to study robberies occurring at
convenience stores, experimented with different techniques, such as lowering cash levels, increas-
ing visibility and lighting, and training store employees not to resist, all in an effort to reduce
robberies. Id. Because of the experimental techniques, robberies decreased 30 percent, and there-
fore, Southland instituted the program in all of its stores in 1976. Id. Then, in 1985, 7-Eleven
supported an Athena Research Corporation study of armed robbers in prison in an effort to update
the earlier research. See W.J. Crow et al., Set Your Sights on Preventing Retail Violence,
SECURITY MGMT., Sept. 1987, at 60. Subsequently, in 1987, the National Association of Conven-
ience Stores endorsed the 7-Eleven robbery and violence prevention program and adopted it for
use by its member companies. See Erickson & Stenseth, supra, at 60. This research was again
updated in 1995 by another Athena Research Corporation study of armed robbers that was sup-
ported by 7-Eleven. See ROSEMARY J. ERICKSON, ARMED ROBBERS AND THEIR CRIMES 1-96
(1996) [hereinafter ARMED ROBBERS]. Additionally, 7-Eleven's program has incorporated other
government, association, and university research as well as utilized many years of field experience
from 7-Eleven and other convenience stores.
94 There is "essentially universal agreement among law enforcement officials and criminolo-
gists that when faced with a gun in a commercial robbery, the victim should not resist." Crow et
al., supra note 93, at 62. Therefore, "[tihe public needs to learn that resistance against a gun is not
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an act of courage but a form of suicide." Id. Justice Maynard noted that 7-Eleven prohibits em-
ployees from interfering with attempted robberies out of recognition of the fact that employees
who interfere with robbers are not only much more likely to suffer injuries themselves but are also
more likely to cause harm to bystanders. Feliciano v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 559 S.E.2d 713, 725 (W. Va.
2001) (Maynard, J., dissenting).
Several studies performed over the past twenty-five years emphasize that an enforced policy
of non-resistance can reduce robbery-related deaths. As reported in 1986, a robbery study by
Zimring and Zuehl, analyzing robbery data in Chicago for a one-year period, revealed that
"[a]ctive resistance accounted for 82 percent of commercial robbery killings." Franklin E. Zim-
ring & James Zuehl, Victim Injury and Death in Urban Robbery: A Chicago Study, J. LEGAL
STUD., Jan. 1986, at 1, 18 n.32 [hereinafter Chicago Study]. Commercial robberies involving
active resistance were estimated to be "forty-nine" times more likely than non-resistance cases to
end in the victim's death. Id. at 18. Furthermore, the study revealed that active non-cooperation
- which included "refusal, flight, and physical force," the type of resistance used in Feliciano -
was "associated with a death risk ... approximately fourteen times as great as cooperation or
passive non-cooperation." Id. Passive non-cooperation, where the "victim usually says he or she
has no money, proved to be "about twice as likely to produce a lethal outcome as no resistance."
Id. The authors of the study therefore concluded that "[f]oss of life in robbery is strongly associ-
ated with active victim resistance." Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
A year later, Dr. Rosemary Erickson co-authored an article that reported on a 1985 Athena
Research Corporation study interviewing 181 convicted armed robbers, which reiterated the im-
portance of non-resistance. See generally Crow et al., supra note 93. The study reemphasized the
findings of the Chicago Study. When the researchers asked the robbers why people get hurt in
robberies, the robbers said, "'[Blecause they wouldn't give up the money, because they tried to
fight, or because they tried to resist."' Id.
Finally, Dr. Erickson authored a book reporting on Athena Research Corporation's 1995
survey that was designed to update the 1985 research. See ARMED ROBBERS, supra note 93, at I-
96; see also Erickson & Stenseth, supra note 93, at 60. This survey polled 310 armed robbers in a
total of twenty different prisons from three different states. See ARMED ROBBERS, supra note 93,
at 13. The robbers' responses echoed the 1985 advice:
When asked why people are hurt in robberies, the answers generally looked as
if they came right out of a training manual for clerks, advising victims not to
resist ... Nearly half (45%) said the victim resists or the victim tries to be a
hero (26%). Then, when asked what advice they would give to someone to
keep from getting hurt, the responses were almost the same, with over half
saying to cooperate with the robber (53%), and 29% saying "give up the
money." Other advice included not making sudden moves, "don't talk,"
"don't stare" and "don't be a hero".
Id. at 52-53. Accordingly, a combined total of 71% of the robbers said that victims get hurt be-
cause they resist; furthermore, 82% of the robbers advised victims to cooperate and just give up
the money. Id. at 52.
As a result of the aforementioned research, government agencies with regulatory control
over the workplace, in their effort to reduce workplace violence and homicide, have also empha-
sized non-resistance. For example in 1993, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health, through the Centers for Disease Control, issued an alert on preventing work-related homi-
cide, which included avoiding resistance to robbery as one of its suggested preventive measures.
See CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., PUB No. 93-109,
PREVENTING HOMICIDE IN THE WORKPLACE 5 (1993). Then, in 1998, the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration issued recommendations for late-night retailers, in which it recommended
that employers train employees in turning over money during a robbery and in not offering resis-
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Eleven's actually serve the greater societal interests and are consistent with pub-
lic policy since they are directed at the specific public interests of protecting
both the public and store employees.
Second, in West Virginia Code section 21-3-1, the West Virginia Legis-
lature expressed a strong public policy for protecting employee safety and wel-
fare.95 Since "[e]very employer shall furnish employment which shall be rea-
sonably safe for the employees therein engaged," this statute creates an unambi-
guous duty for employers.96 More explicitly, the statute outlines the manner in
which this duty is to be fulfilled by expressing that employers not only "shall
furnish and use safety devices and safeguards" but also "shall adopt and use
methods and processes reasonably adequate to render employment and the place
of employment safe. 97 Beyond these requirements, the statute mandates that
employers "do every other thing reasonably necessary to protect the life, health,
safety, and welfare of such employees. 98
By firing Feliciano for violating its nonresistance policy - a safeguard
clearly designed and proven to ensure worker safety, 7-Eleven was conceivably
only taking action it deemed as "reasonably necessary to protect the life, health,
safety, and welfare of [its] employees." 99 An employee who fails to comply
with a nonresistance policy creates a greater safety risk for himself and other
employees because that employee increases the likelihood that he or she or an-
other employee will be killed or injured during the robbery.1'° Firing such an
employee for violating the policy therefore should be valid under section 21-3-1
because it is a reasonably necessary action designed to protect the safety of
other employees. A public policy allowing for self-defense in this situation
clearly conflicts with the employer's duty to take what it considers to be rea-
tance. OSHA, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, OSH 3153, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR WORKPLACE VIOLENCE
PREVENTION PROGRAMS IN LATE-NIGHT RETAIL ESTABLISHMENTS 8 (1998),
http://www.osha.gov/Publications/osha3153.pdf. Moreover, these recommendations specifically
acknowledged 7-Eleven's successful robbery and violence deterrence program, which included
the non-resistance policy at issue in Feliciano. See id. at 6.
The lesson for commercial retailers is then clear - "establish a policy of nonresistance and
give it top priority in training programs. Failure to provide adequate training may expose employ-
ers to claims of negligence in providing a safe work." Crow et al., supra note 93, at 62.
95 The purpose of this section is to guarantee workers that their workplace will be safe.
Burdette v. Columbia Gas Transmission Corp., 480 S.E.2d 565, 566 (W. Va. 1996).
96 W. VA. CODE § 21-3-1 (2003).
97 Id. (emphasis added).
98 Id. (emphasis added).
99 Id. (emphasis added).
100 See supra note 94.
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sonably necessary action to protect the life, safety, and welfare of its employ-
ees.
101
In response to the employee's claim of wrongful discharge for using
self-defense, the North Carolina Court of Appeals in McLaughlin v. Barclays
American Corp. 02 stated that "[w]e do not perceive the kind of deleterious con-
sequences for the general public, if we uphold [the employer's] action."',0 3 In
Feliciano, there were likewise no deleterious consequences for the general pub-
lic from 7-Eleven firing Feliciano. The threat to the public comes from employ-
ees exercising the right of self-defense under these dangerous circumstances.
2. Determining Whether "Lethal Imminent Danger" Existed and
Judicial Second-Guessing
The Feliciano majority narrowed its holding by including the language
"response to lethal imminent danger" and establishing a rebuttable presumption
for the employer.' °4 Therefore, Feliciano probably would not preclude an em-
ployer from firing an employee who exercised self-defense in a case with facts
analogous to McLaughlin.10 5 In that case, Barclays fired McLaughlin following
a scuffle with one of his subordinates, in which the subordinate punched him
and McLaughlin threw up his hand, striking the subordinate in the face in re-
sponse. °6 The North Carolina Court of Appeals rejected McLaughlin's wrong-
ful discharge claim based on violation of his right to use self-defense. 107
Suppose, however, that the employee in McLaughlin had been a small,
thin man and his attacker had been much taller and heavier. With these added
facts, it is conceivable that in post-Feliciano West Virginia, the employee could
now claim that the attacker's size and weight posed a "lethal imminent danger."
Initially, the employer would have to consider whether the employee acted in
self-defense and whether "lethal imminent danger" actually existed. But even if
the employer concluded that no such danger existed and thereafter fired the em-
ployee, Feliciano has opened the door for this employee to file a wrongful dis-
101 See Escalante v. Wilson's Art Studio, Inc., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 187, 193 (Ct. App. 2003).
"[S]tatutes imposing upon employers a duty to maintain a safe work place actually work against
the [plaintiff], rather than supply him with a public policy to sustain his [wrongful discharge]
claim [based on self-defense]." Id. at 193 (citing CAL. LAB. CODE § 6401 (2003), which provides
in pertinent part that "every employer shall do every other thing reasonably necessary to protect
the life, safety, and health of employees"); see also id. ("[T]he maintenance of a safe workplace,
for the benefit of all employees, is an important interest that could not be bargained away.").
102 382 S.E.2d 836 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989).
103 Id. at 840.
104 Feliciano v. 7-Eleven, Inc. 559 S.E.2d 713,724 (W. Va. 2001).
1o5 382 S.E.2d 836.
106 Id. at 838.
107 Id. at 837.
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charge claim, in which the court system will second-guess the employer and
make the ultimate determination as to whether the employee faced the requisite
level of danger.10 8 In other words, because of Feliciano, each time an employer
fires an employee who claims self-defense, a jury will have to determine
whether a "lethal imminent danger" actually existed, thus placing employer
management decisions in the court system's overburdened hands. 109
3. Leaves Employers Without Guidance and Demonstrates the
Unpredictability of the Public Policy Exception
As Feliciano evidences, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeal's
application of the substantial public policy exception as an equitable device
leaves employers unable to predict when a terminated employee may find safe-
harbor in a previously unidentified substantial public policy. The important
lesson from Birthisel v. Tri-Cities Health Service Corp., which the Feliciano
court discussed but seemingly ignored, is that "[an employer should not be ex-
posed to liability where a public policy standard is too general to provide any
specific guidance or is so vague that it is subject to different interpretations." ' 0
Significantly, the court in Feliciano added that to be "substantial," the public
policy "must not just be recognizable as such but must be so widely regarded as
to be evident to employers and employees alike.""' Self-defense as a public
policy is too general and vague to be evident to employers." 12
By holding otherwise, the Feliciano majority ignored Birthisel's lesson
as well as its own directives. The majority emotionally responded to the in-
credible facts before it, creating a fact-specific, equitable remedy in an attempt
to secure Feliciano a cause of action, instead of strictly adhering to the state's
public policy exception framework." 3 As Chief Justice Holmes once wrote,
108 See Scott v. Extracorporeal, Inc., 545 A.2d 334, 342 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988). Whether an
employee experienced a "lethal imminent danger" is a question of fact, and the standard is mostly
subjective, but the burden of production does not shift back to the employee once the employer
shows a legitimate reason for terminating; therefore, it will be almost impossible for a court to get
rid of meritless claims by motion.
109 As discussed further infra Part V.B.2., other jurisdictions have specifically declined to adopt
self-defense as a public policy, in part, because of this problem.
110 Feliciano v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 559 S.E.2d 713, 718 (W. Va. 2001) (quoting Birthisel v. Tri-
Cities Health Serv. Corp., 424 S.E.2d 606, 612 (W. Va. 1992)).
III Id. at 718.
112 For cases from other jurisdictions concluding that self-defense is not a clear mandate of
public policy, see discussion infra Part V.B.2.a-b.
"3 The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals considered Feliciano in the month following
the tragic events of September 11, 2001. See Feliciano, 559 S.E.2d at 713 (indicating that the case
was submitted to the court on October 2, 2001 and the court filed its opinion on November 30,
2001). If you recall, one of the great stories to emerge from that terrible day was the heroism of
the passengers on Flight 93, who attacked their high-jackers and successfully diverted the plane
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Great cases like hard cases make bad law. For great cases are
called great, not by reason of their real importance in shaping
the law of the future, but because of some accident of immedi-
ate overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and dis-
torts the judgment. These immediate interests exercise a kind
of hydraulic pressure which makes what previously was clear
seem doubtful, and before which even well settled principles of
law will bend.'
14
In Feliciano, with the facts exerting the "hydraulic pressure," the majority bent
the settled principles of the public policy exception to dictate what it thought to
be an equitable resolution." 5 The majority, however, never acknowledged the
negative consequences that prompted other jurisdictions to earlier reject self-
defense as a public policy exception." 6 In his dissenting comments in Gardner
v. Loomis Armored Inc.," 7 Washington Supreme Court Justice Madsen criti-
cized, "The result of the majority's analysis is that the public policy exception to
employment-at-will now applies to a fifth, completely incompatible category;
that is, where this court disagrees with an employer's definition of just cause for
termination, as set forth in the workplace rules."" 8 This criticism is equally
applicable to the majority's decision in Feliciano.
Other recent West Virginia cases also demonstrate that the Supreme
Court of Appeals is discovering public polices in a variety of places.' '9 For ex-
from its intended target. Due to the overwhelming support and praise for the passengers' use of
self-defense and the temporal proximity of this case to September 1 th, one can easily see how the
West Virginia court could have been motivated by Feliciano's heroics. However, "[c]ourts should
proceed cautiously when making public policy determinations. No employer should be subject to
suit merely because a discharged employee's conduct was praiseworthy or because the public may
have derived some benefit from it." Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 840
(Wisc. 1983).
114 N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
115 However, a federal jury was not quite as convinced that Feliciano was wrongfully termi-
nated in this case as the majority. In October 23, 2002, in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of West Virginia, a jury found, after a short deliberation, that Feliciano had not
been terminated in contravention of the substantial public policy of self-defense. See Feliciano v.
7-Eleven, Inc., No.3:00cv89 (N.D. W. Va. Oct. 25, 2002) (order entering judgment against Fe-
liciano).
116 See infra Part V.B.2.a-b.
117 913 P.2d 377, 387 (Wash. 1996).
118 Id. at 387 (Madsen, J., dissenting). For a discussion of Gardner, see infra notes 153-171
and accompanying text.
119 See Public Policy Revisited: An Increasingly Attractive Opportunity for Employees, W. VA.
EMP. L. LETTrER, (Steptoe & Johnson, PLLC, Clarksburg, W. Va.), June 2002, available at LEXIS
Legal News, MSWVEM File.
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ample, in Kanagy v. Fiesta Salons, Inc.,120 the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals discovered a substantial public policy in regulations governing the
Board of Barbers and Cosmetologists that require all licensees to report viola-
tions of regulations to the Board.' 2' The dissent in Kanagy reasoned that "a
substantial public policy now can be found in the most obscure and petty State
regulation and used to further erode the employment-at-will-doctrine. When
you consider that executive agencies chum out rules like Stephen King chums
out novels, this is a scary development."'' 22 Also, in Tudor v. Charleston Area
Medical Center, Inc., 23 an employee, claiming wrongful discharge after she was
terminated for complaining about staffing, convinced the court that a substantial
public policy existed in regulations covering licensure of hospitals. 24 The court
has even used the public policy exception to circumvent clear legislative intent
expressed in the West Virginia Human Rights Act,' 25 by holding in Williamson
v. Greene, 26 that
even though a discharged at-will employee has no statutory
claim for retaliatory discharge under.., the West Virginia Hu-
man Rights Act ... the discharged employee may nevertheless
maintain a common law claim for retaliatory discharge against
the employer based on alleged sex discrimination or sexual har-
assment because sex discrimination and sexual harassment in
employment contravene the public policy of this State articu-
lated in the West Virginia Human Rights Act.... 27
120 541 S.E.2d 616 (W. Va. 2000).
121 Id. at 622-23.
122 Id. at 624 (Maynard, J., dissenting).
123 506 S.E.2d 554 (W. Va. 1997).
124 Id. at 567.
125 W. VA. CODE §§ 5-11 -1 to -9 (2003).
126 490 S.E.2d 23 (W. Va. 1997).
127 Id. at 33. In Williamson, the plaintiff did not have a claim under the West Virginia Human
Rights Act ("WVHRA") because her employer did not meet the definition of employer under the
Act as proscribed by the Legislature. Id. at 28; see W. VA. CODE § 5-11-3(d) (requiring that, to be
considered an employer under the WVHRA, the employer must "employ[] twelve or more per-
sons within the state"). Despite the clear legislative mandate that the WVHRA not apply unless
the employer in question met the definition in § 5-11-3(d), the court held that the policy expressed
in the Act was sufficient to create a public policy exception. Williamson, 490 S.E.2d at 33. But
see Travis v. Alcon Laboratories, Inc., 504 S.E.2d 419, 433-34 (W. Va. 1998).
In Travis, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals rejected an argument from a white,
male plaintiff, under the age of forty, that "the West Virginia Human Rights Act in general, and
W. Va. Code, 5-1 1-2 [1994] in particular, establishes a substantial public policy that no individual
may be deprived of his human rights or civil rights for any reason in West Virginia." Id. at 433.
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Along with Feliciano, these cases demonstrate not only that employers
will have more difficulty determining when terminating an employee violates a
substantial public policy but also show that the future of the at-will rule appears
dark. Analyzing cases like Feliciano has led one commentator to conclude that
"[t]he future of employment-at-will . . . is that it has no future,"'128 but rather
"[o]ne of the most important developments in employment law in the first dec-
ade of the new millennium will be the express acknowledgement of the death of
this doctrine." 29 Feliciano provides another blow to the weary doctrine in West
Virginia.
B. A Closer Look at Self-Defense Public Policy Cases Mentioned by the
Majority
Although an issue of first impression for the state, West Virginia was
not the first jurisdiction to address whether self-defense is a public policy excep-
tion to the at-will employment rule. In the Feliciano majority opinion, Justice
Davis mentioned that other jurisdictions confronted with the issue have reached
varied conclusions. 30 This statement is somewhat misleading. On one hand,
the court cited three cases, which it said stand for the proposition that self-
Instead, the court looked to the express language of the WVHRA, stating the "question is whether
the individual was discriminated against because of race, religion, color, national origin, ancestry,
sex, age [defined as over forty in the WVHRA], blindness, or handicap." Id.; see W. VA. CODE §§
5-11-2, 5-11-3(k) (2003). Accordingly, the court held that "no general public policy against har-
assment in the workplace is created by the West Virginia Human Rights Act for purposes of West
Virginia wrongful discharge law." Travis, 504 S.E.2d at 433.
According to one commentator, cases like Williamson are prime examples of judicial activ-
ism. See Mascari, supra note 36 (manuscript at 39).
In Williamson, the court effectively lifted the small business exemption of the
WVHRA by holding an employer with less than twelve employees liable under a
Harless claim public policy exception despite the lack of a constitutional, statutory,
administrative, or common law basis. The decision ... could also allow plaintiff em-
ployees to maintain a Harless claim where their employers fail to meet the definition
of an "employer" under the WVHRA for other reasons, such as independent contrac-
tor relationship. This misuse of the Harless cause of action renders definitions and
exceptions contained in WVHRA meaningless and expands the scope of the Act be-
yond what the legislature intended.
Id.
128 Deborah A. Ballam, Employment-At-Will: The Impending Death of a Doctrine, 37 AM. BUS.
L J. 653, 686 (2000); see also Bastress, supra note 36, at 341 (stating that the "at-will doctrine is
reeling"). But see Summers, supra note 2, at 73 ("The employer's divine right to dismiss at any
time, for any reason, without notice has survived with vigor."); Id. at 84 (stating that "the concep-
tion of the employment relation as one of employer dominance and employee subservience con-
tinues to be a powerful, if not a prevailing, force in American labor law").
129 Ballam, supra note 128, at 686.
130 See Feliciano v. 7-Eleven, 559 S.E.2d 713, 723 n.10 (W. Va. 2001).
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defense constitutes a substantial public policy: Babick v. Oregon Arena Corp.,
131 Ellis v. City of Seattle, 132 and Gardner v. Loomis Armored, Inc.13 3 Of these
cases, however, only Gardner has even remotely analogous facts and none of
the cases frame the public policy at issue as the right to use self-defense, there-
fore begging the question: Why did the Feliciano court cite these as supporting
self-defense as a public policy exception?
On the other hand, the opinion briefly mentioned three cases, McLaugh-
lin v. Barclays American Corp.,' 34 Bagwell v. Peninsula Regional Medical Cen-
ter,135 and Scott v. Extracorporeal, Inc.,' 36 which have all clearly rejected self-
defense as a substantial public policy. However, the majority eschewed the col-
lective wisdom of these cases without explaining why the reasoning therein was
unpersuasive or inapplicable to the case before it.
The first subsection below breaks down the first set of cases, emphasiz-
ing that they fail to provide any guidance on the self-defense issue in Feliciano.
The next subsection discusses the second set of cases, focusing on the argu-
ments that prompted these other jurisdictions to reject self-defense as a substan-
tial public policy.
1. Self-Defense as a Public Policy Exception Not at Issue
In Feliciano, the majority first cited the Oregon Court of Appeals' dis-
position of Babick v. Oregon Arena Corp'37 as authority that self-defense is a
substantial public policy, but that case is no longer good law because the Oregon
Supreme Court has since reversed the intermediate court's ruling on the wrong-
ful discharge claim. 138 Nevertheless, the case is discussed below to demonstrate
that it did not consider the issue of self-defense as a public policy exception.
In Babick, the plaintiffs were security officers hired to provide security
and medical assistance at events held in the defendant's arena. 139 The defendant
trained these officers in arrest protocol and defense tactics, but after some of the
officers arrested some fans and attempted to arrest others at a concert, the de-
fendant terminated the officers who performed the arrests as well as those who
131 980 P.2d 1147 (Or. Ct. App. 1999), rev'd in part by 40 P.3d 1059 (Or. 2002).
132 13 P.3d 1065 (Wash. 2000).
133 913 P.2d 377 (Wash. 1996).
134 382 S.E.2d 836 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989).
135 665 A.2d 297 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995).
136 545 A.2d 334 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
137 980 P.2d 1147 (Or. Ct. App. 1999), rev'd in part by 40 P.3d 1059 (Or. 2002).
138 Babick v. Oregon Arena Corp., 40 P.3d 1059 (Or. 2002).
139 Id. at 1060.
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were not involved and even those who were not working that night. 140 All the
officers were fired because of the lawful actions of those officers at the con-
cert.14 1 In response, the discharged officers filed suit, alleging that they had
been "wrongful[ly] discharge[d] . . . for fulfilling an important societal duty, i.e.,
arresting lawbreakers." 142 As support for their position, the plaintiffs cited stat-
utes regulating the licensing and training of private security personnel, permit-
ting private persons to make arrests, and permitting persons to use physical
force in making an arrest.
43
The Oregon Supreme Court, nevertheless, concluded that neither the
statutes brought to its attention nor those the Court of Appeals relied upon sup-
ported a conclusion that "some substantial public policy requires the kinds of
acts that allegedly triggered plaintiffs' discharge"; thus, no wrongful discharge
claim was stated. 144 Unlike Feliciano, the Babick plaintiffs neither pleaded that
they were fired for using self-defense nor argued that self-defense supported
their wrongful discharge claim. Therefore, since both the Oregon Court of Ap-
peals and the Oregon Supreme Court lacked an opportunity to address the issue
of self-defense as a public policy, it is unclear how this case could stand for the
proposition that self-defense constitutes a substantial public policy exception.
Ellis v. City of Seattle145 was the second case cited in Feliciano as sup-
port for finding that self-defense qualifies as a substantial public policy. In
Ellis, the Supreme Court of Washington was faced with determining whether the
plaintiff, a sound technician at a Seattle-area arena, presented sufficient evi-
dence to survive a motion for summary judgment on his wrongful discharge
claim.' 46 The arena's fire alarm system contained a feature where after the
alarm was triggered, it shut off the arena's public address system ("PA") - a
feature which allowed emergency officials to use microphones in another room
to direct audience members to safety in the event of a fire.147 Knowing that the
fire department had not authorized his employers to bypass the PA shut-off fea-
ture, Ellis - concerned about the potential danger to the public - refused to
disable it in spite of insistence from his employer.148 Thereafter, Ellis was ter-
minated for his refusal. 49 In response, he filed a wrongful discharge claim. 150
140 Id.
141 Babick, 980 P.2d at 1148.
142 Babick, 40 P.3d at 1060.
143 See id. at 1062.
144 Id. at 1063.
145 13 P.3d 1065 (Wash. 2000).
146 Id. at 1066.
147 Id. at 1067.
148 Id. at 1067-69.
149 Id. at 1069.
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The Washington Supreme Court held that terminating Ellis for raising questions
about the legality of by-passing the PA component jeopardized the clear public
policy of following the fire code mandate permitting only certified persons to
work on fire alarm systems. 1
51
When considering the facts and issues, it is perplexing how Ellis actu-
ally relates to the issue of self-defense as a substantial public policy. Neither the
facts nor the public policy implicated relate to self-defense. Accordingly, Ellis
cannot be reasonably characterized as supporting the proposition that self-
defense constitutes a substantial public policy.
Turning to the third case cited in Feliciano, Gardner v. Loomis Ar-
mored, Inc.152 similarly involves a heroic employee being fired for violating a
company policy. The plaintiff, Gardner, was a driver and guard for the defen-
dant's armored-vehicle company. 53 At a bank stop, Gardner stayed in the vehi-
cle's driver compartment while his partner entered the bank. 54 Shortly thereaf-
ter, he observed the bank's manager running out of the bank, screaming as a
man armed with a knife chased her.15 5 As she ran by the armored vehicle, the
manager cried to Gardner for help. 5 6 But, as Gardner exited the vehicle to as-
sist the manager, the attacker released her and grabbed another employee, who
he dragged into the bank. 157 Gardner proceeded into the bank where he and his
partner subdued and disarmed the attacker. 58 Similar to 7-Eleven's response in
Feliciano, Gardner's employer terminated him for violating a "'fundamental'
company rule forbidding armored truck drivers from leaving the truck unat-
tended," a violation which the employee handbook set forth as grounds for ter-
mination. 159 Gardner filed a wrongful discharge suit in federal court claiming
contravention of a public policy thereby prompting the federal court to certify a
question to the Supreme Court of Washington. 
60
150 Id.
151 Id. at 1074 ("Public policy should encourage the safe operation of fire alarm systems, and
Ellis was furthering that policy by refusing, as an uncertified electrician, to work on the fire alarm
system to alter the way it was designed to operate, in the absence of authority for doing so.").
152 913 P.2d 377 (Wash. 1996).




157 Id. at 379.
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington certified this
question to the Supreme Court of Washington: "Does it violate public policy in the State of
Washington to discharge an at-will employee for violating a company rule in order to go to the
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Relying on the same four-part wrongful discharge analysis adopted in
Feliciano,'6 1 the Washington Supreme Court evaluated whether three different
sources of public policy met the clarity element, i.e., whether any clear mandate
of public policy existed. Of the three sources Gardner offered, none were
framed as self-defense: (1) a public policy encouraging citizens to assist in law
enforcement; (2) a public policy embodied in the Rescue and Good Samaritan
Doctrines, i.e., a policy encouraging others in need of care; and (3) a public pol-
icy encouraging the aid of a citizen in danger of serious physical injury or
death. 
162
Most of the Gardner majority's analysis focused on the third policy ar-
gument. According to the majority, "[s]ociety places the highest priority on the
protection of human life. This fundamental public policy is clearly evidenced
by countless statutes and judicial decisions."'' 63 The court accordingly framed
the public policy in question as protecting human life.' 64 As evidence of this
public policy, the majority cited cases where protection of human life subordi-
nates certain constitutional rights 65 and cases and statutes where protection of
human life serves as a defense to criminal charges - self-defense, defense of
others, and the defense of duress. 166 However, instead of specifically determin-
ing whether self-defense alone constituted a public policy exception, the Gard-
ner majority synthesized "policies from a number of laws which [were] only
tangentially related to the public policy which the majority want[ed] to find."'
167
Thus, in its synthesis, the court did not cite these self-defense cases and statutes
as proof that the right to use self-defense is a clear expression of public policy,
as was the case in Feliciano, but rather to show that self-defense was one piece
of a broader public policy puzzle. The dissent, objecting that self-defense was
even evidence of the broader policy of saving others from harm, stated that
"self-defense [is] aimed at protecting persons from criminal [or civil] prosecu-
tion - not at encouraging citizens to help those in need."'' 68
Moreover, the dissent warned that the Gardner majority had thrust a
new burden upon the Washington courts. That is, "[u]nder the guise of a claim
assistance of a citizen held hostage at the scene of a crime, and/or who is in danger of serious
physical injury and/or death?" Id.
161 See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
162 See Gardner, 913 P.2d at 381-82.
163 Id. at 383.
164 Id.
165 See id. at 384. For example, the court cited warrantless searches based on the exigent cir-
cumstances of preventing harm to officers or individuals as an exception to the Fourth Amend-
ment.
166 Id. at 384.
167 Id. at 388 (Madsen, J., dissenting).
168 Id. at 389 (Madsen, J., dissenting) (quotations and citations omitted).
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that the public policy exception to the terminable at-will doctrine should apply,
courts will now be forced to analyze an employer's work rules to determine
whether they provide a proper cause for termination."' 169 Like the Washington
court in Gardner, the West Virginia court in Feliciano also failed to appreciate
this consequence of its decision, an error made more glaring when one considers
that courts in other jurisdictions, prior to Feliciano, had found this slippery slope
a compelling reason to reject self-defense as a public policy exception. ,
70
2. Refusing to Adopt Self-Defense as a Public Policy Exception
a. North Carolina - McLaughlin v. Barclays American
Corp. and Maryland - Bagwell v. Peninsula Re-
gional Medical Center
McLaughlin v. Barclays American Corp.,171 a North Carolina decision,
and Bagwell v. Peninsula Regional Medical Center,172 a Maryland decision, are
interconnected because the court in Bagwell relied upon McLaughlin as author-
ity for its holding that self-defense does not constitute a public policy exception
to the at-will employment rule. Because of this interrelatedness, this subsection
discusses the two cases in conjunction with one another.
In Bagwell, the plaintiff, Bagwell, worked as a security officer at the de-
fendant hospital. 73 While Bagwell was on late-night duty in the emergency
room, a patient was brought in, who was having seizures induced by over-
consumption of alcohol. 74 Drugs given to the patient en route to the hospital
had stopped the seizures; nevertheless, the patient trashed violently and berated
the hospital staff with verbal abuse, even threatening to kill them if not re-
leased.175 Bagwell, complying with the attending physician's orders, joined
with other staff in restraining the patient.176 While secured with leather straps,
the patient bit Bagwell on the wrist - prompting him to strike the patient on the
head. 177 After the incident, Bagwell was terminated. In response, he filed sev-
169 Id. at 392 (Madsen, J., dissenting).
170 See infra Part V.B.2. a-b.
171 382 S.E.2d 836 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989).
172 665 A.2d 297 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1995).
173 Id. at 302.
174 Id. at 303.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Id. In this case, there was a dispute as to whether Bagwell responded reflexively in self-
defense or later hit the patient in retaliation. However, in reviewing the lower court's summary
judgment of the case, the court looked at the facts in the light most favorable to Bagwell and de-
termined that he had reacted in self-defense. See id. at 306.
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eral causes of action, including a wrongful discharge claim. 178 Bagwell argued
that his termination contravened two public policies: his duties as a security
officer and his right to self-defense. 179 As support for his self-defense argument,
Bagwell relied on Watson v. Peoples Security Life Insurance, which held that a
person's right to seek legal redress for actionable torts represents a public policy
exception to the at-will doctrine.18
0
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals, however, rejected Bagwell's
self-defense argument for two reasons. First, the court distinguished Watson,
stating the case "never considered whether the right to act violently, even in
self-defense, is protected by a clear mandate of public policy.' ' 8' Second, the
court found the North Carolina Court of Appeals' reasoning in McLaughlin v.
Barclays American Corp.' 
82 to be particularly persuasive.1
83
In McLaughlin, the plaintiff, McLaughlin, was counseling one of his
subordinates, but during their conversation, the subordinate grew argumentative,
and McLaughlin asked him to leave the room, which the subordinate refused to
do.184 McLaughlin decided that he would just leave the room instead, but as he
neared the door, the subordinate punched him in the chest. 85 In response,
McLaughlin threw up his hand to defend himself, and in the process, struck the
subordinate in the face. 86  Several days after the incident, Barclays fired
McLaughlin.' 87 Thereafter, McLaughlin filed a wrongful discharge claim in
which he urged the court to recognize self-defense as a public policy excep-
tion. ls
The North Carolina Court of Appeals rejected McLaughlin's self-
defense argument. The court first emphasized that North Carolina's public pol-
icy exception cases have "focused on the harm to the public at large."' 89 Ac-
cordingly, the courts in both McLaughlin and Bagwell held that in the facts be-
fore them, public policy implications were not present and there were no "dele-
178 See id. at 302.
179 Id. at 310.
180 See id. at 312 (citing Watson v. Peoples Sec. Life Ins., 588 A.2d 760 (Md. 1991) (involving
an employee discharged for suing a co-worker for assault and battery)).
181 Id. at 312.
182 382 S.E.2d 836 (N.C. Ct. App. 1989).
183 Bagwell, 665 A.2d at 312.
184 McLaughlin, 382 S.E.2d at 837.
185 Id. at 838.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Id. at 838-39.
189 Id. at 840.
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terious consequences for the general public" if the discharges were upheld. 90
Second, both courts looked to whether bad faith was involved.' 9' Although the
courts determined that the employer decisions at issue may have been "indiffer-
ent and illogical," both courts emphasized that they did not "demonstrate the
kind of bad faith that has prompted courts to recognize causes of action [for
wrongful discharge].' 92  Third, the McLaughlin court realized that finding a
cause of action in this case would open the floodgates, i.e., "every employee
involved in an altercation would assert a self-defense justification, spawning the
very deluge [of spurious claims previously] warned against."' 93 The Bagwell
court also found this argument convincing. 1
94
Although the facts in these two cases were not as emotionally charged
as those in Feliciano, all three jurisdictions dealt with the same question of law:
whether firing an employee for using self-defense "has a tendency to be injuri-
ous to the public or against the public good."'195  As both McLaughlin and
Bagwell first emphasized, firing an employee for an altercation, even though he
or she claims self-defense, does not result in any injurious consequences for the
public at-large. The Feliciano majority, however, never addressed why firing
someone for exercising self-defense injures or threatens the public or is against
the public good. Instead, the Feliciano court focused solely on the wealth of
West Virginia civil and criminal cases that have recognized self-defense as an
individual defense to civil and criminal liability.196 However, Maryland, North
190 Id. at 840, quoted in, Bagwell v. Peninsula Reg'i Med. Ctr., 665 A.2d 297, 312 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1995).
191 See McLaughlin, 382 S.E.2d at 840; Bagwell, 665 A.2d at 312-13.
192 McLaughlin, 382 S.E.2d at 840, quoted in, Bagwell, 665 A.2d at 312-13.
193 McLaughlin, 382 S.E.2d at 840.
194 See Bagwell, 665 A.2d at 313.
195 Feliciano v. 7-Eleven, 559 S.E.2d 713, 718 (W. Va. 2001) (quotations and citations omit-
ted).
196 The California Court of Appeals recently considered whether an employer could fire an
employee for using his "constitutionally-guaranteed right to self-defense" in Escalante v. Wilson's
Art Studio, Inc., 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d 187, 188 (Ct. App. 2003), review denied, No. S1 17605, 2003
Cal. LEXIS 6651 (Cal. Sept. 10, 2003) (unpublished opinion). While the court conceded that "the
laws of our state certainly allow one to engage in self-defense," id. at 191, the court concluded
that "nothing in any of these provisions .. specifically encourages individuals to exercise their
right of self-defense in a given situation for the benefit of the public." Id. at 192. Moreover, the
court added, "Not every right guaranteed to citizens by statute, or event the Constitution, is one
which society has a rooting interest in seeing exercised." Id. In a comment particularly relevant
to the West Virginia Supreme Court's hasty determination that "an individual's right to self-
defense in West Virginia has been sufficiently established in and clarified by our State's common
law so as to render it a substantial public policy," see Feliciano, 559 S.E.2d at 722, the California
court added that "the Penal Code provisions do nothing more than establish that reasonable self-
defense it not a crime itself. But exempting certain conduct from criminal sanction is not the same
as advocating it." Escalante, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 192.
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Carolina, and Pennsylvania,197 all states that rejected self-defense as a public
policy exception pre-Feliciano, have also recognized self-defense as an affirma-
tive defense in the civil and criminal contexts.
98
Additionally, the McLaughlin and Bagwell courts warned that finding
self-defense as a public policy would open the floodgates to wrongful discharge
claims based on this exception. As emphasized before, 99 the Feliciano court
failed to heed this warning, and thus, has created a situation where employers
now have little guidance and management decisions concerning how to handle
fighting or disruptive employees will be second-guessed by the courts. The
problem of judicial second-guessing of employer management decisions was the
exact basis for the Superior Court of Pennsylvania's rejection of self-defense as
a public policy exception in Scott v. Extracorporeal, Inc.2 °
b. Pennsylvania - Scott v. Extracorporeal, Inc.
The following facts were before the court in Scott. The plaintiff had
been arguing with a co-worker. 20  Following a joint meeting with their supervi-
sor, the co-worker hit the plaintiff from behind, knocking her unconscious.0 2
While on the ground, the co-worker jumped on the plaintiff and pulled her
hair.2 °3 The plaintiff was fired for the fight, and subsequently filed a wrongful
discharge claim against the defendant company.2°  She claimed that self-
defense was a public policy exception to the at-will employment rule and that
this public policy was embodied in a statute justifying the use of self-defense.20 5
The Pennsylvania Superior Court, however, disagreed, holding
197 See infra Part V.B.2.b.
198 Maryland, see, e.g., DeVaughn v. State, 194 A.2d 109 (Md. 1963) (self-defense as defense
to criminal liability); Bait. Transit Co. v. Faulkner, 20 A.2d 485 (Md. 1941) (self-defense as a
defense to civil liability); North Carolina, see, e.g., State v. Webster, 378 S.E.2d 748 (N.C. 1989);
State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989) (both stating the rule for use of self-defense as a de-
fense to criminal liability); Pennsylvania, see 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 503(a) (West 2003)
(statute outlining the defense of justification in the criminal context); id. § 505; Kitay v. Halpern,
158 A. 309, 310 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1932) (stating that the law governing self-defense in civil cases is
much the same as that in criminal cases; i.e., "while a man may inflict grievous bodily harm or kill
another in self defense, he may not do so if he has other probable means of escape").
199 See supra Part V.A. 1-3.
200 545 A.2d 334 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988).
201 Scott, 545 A.2d at 335.
202 Id.
203 Id.
204 Id. at 335-36.
205 See id. at 340-41 (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN § 505 which states: "The use of force
upon or toward another person is justifiable when the actor believes that such force is immediately
necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such other
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in the context of the facts of this case, the public policy asserted
by [the plaintiff] - the right to exercise self-defense - strikes
entirely too near the employer's legitimate interest . . . . To re-
verse [the lower court's holding against the plaintiff] would
have the unwise effect of transferring to the judicial forum the
duty of evaluating the propriety of management decisions.2 °6
Because of Feliciano, West Virginia is the lone jurisdiction to have ad-
dressed the issue and declared that self-defense constitutes a substantial public
policy exception to the at-will employment rule. In so holding, the Feliciano
majority ignored arguments against such a position that these other jurisdictions
found quite compelling.20 7 By not following the guidance of McLaughlin,
person on the present occasion.").
206 Id. at 342-43 (quotations and citations omitted).
207 Since Feliciano, only one other jurisdiction, California, has addressed self-defense as a
public policy exception. The California court in Escalante v. Wilson's Art Studio, Inc., also found
that the right to use self-defense did not support the plaintiffs wrongful discharge claim. 135 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 187 (Ct. App. 2003), review denied, No. S 117605, 2003 Cal. LEXIS 6651 (Cal. Sept. 10,
2003) (unpublished opinion); see supra note 195. In Escalante, the plaintiff, Escalante, was
physically attacked by a co-worker. Escalante, 135 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 189. At one point, Escalante
left the room where the incident occurred, but the co-worker followed him and eventually threw a
box of screws, striking Escalante in the back. See id. Thereafter, Escalante abandoned his retreat,
rushed his co-worker and grabbed him in a bear hug. Id. At this time, the co-worker hit Escalante
in the head with a large metal cap, which caused a gash on Escalante's head resulting in substan-
tial bleeding. Id. Disagreeing with his decision to abandon his flight, Escalante's employer ter-
minated him after hearing his side of the story. Id. Escalante thereafter brought a wrongful dis-
charge claim based on violation of his right to use self-defense. Id. at 1189-90.
After a jury award in favor of Escalante, his employer moved for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict and for a new trial on the grounds that the damages were excessive and that self-
defense was not the type of public policy that supports a wrongful discharge claim. Id. at 190.
The trial court denied both motions as to the self-defense issue. See id. at 190.
In its analysis, the California court more precisely focused on whether the aspect of self-
defense permitting a person not to retreat from a fight promoted the public interest. Id. at 193.
The court emphasized that, while the laws of California "allow" a person to use self-defense, id. at
191-92, nothing in California law "specifically encourages individuals to exercise their right in a
given situation for the benefit of the public." Id. at 192. According to the court, "the public inter-
est is not harmed by a requirement that employees must avoid physical conflict, whenever possi-
ble, in the work place." Id. at 193. Furthermore, the court reasoned that "the maintenance of a
safe workplace, for the benefit of all employees, is an important interest that cannot be bargained
away." Id. To the court, Escalante choosing to abandon his retreat "did not tend to promote
workplace safety." Id. Therefore, the court reasoned that "statutes imposing upon employers a
duty to maintain a safe work place actually work[ed] against Escalante, rather than supply him
with the public policy to sustain his claim." Id. Accordingly, the court held that Escalante's ter-
mination violated no public policy. See id. at 194. However, it is important to note that the Esca-
lante court indicated in dicta that "[t]here may be some circumstances under which an employee's
decision to engage in self-defense would be promotive of a public policy"; however, the public
policy the court cited was not self-defense but rather the preservation of human life. Id. at 193
(providing as an example that "an employee were backed into a corner by his attacker, with no
2004]
35
Ewing: Bad Facts, Bad Law: Feliciano v. 7-Eleven, Inc. and Self-Defense
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2004
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
Bagwell, and Scott, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has potentially
created great problems for both the state's employers and its judiciary.
VI. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS: FELICIANO AND BLAKE v. JOHN SKIDMORE
TRUCK STOP, INC. AND THEIR POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR EMPLOYERS
In his dissent in Feliciano,20 8 Justice Maynard connected the majority's
holding with the court's earlier ruling in Blake v. John Skidmore Truck Stop,
Inc., in which he also dissented.2° In Blake, the plaintiff was working as cash-
ier at John Skidmore's store, when an unknown assailant stabbed her during a
robbery. 210 She sued Skidmore, claiming his failure to provide basic security
measures exposed her to greater risk of a criminal attack, therefore constituting
a deliberate intention claim. 21' On appeal, the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals held that an employer's worker's compensation immunity for work-
place injuries could be abrogated under the deliberate intention exception for
employee injuries caused by third-party criminal acts.212 In other words, the
court held that a third-party criminal act, such as a robbery, could be grounds for
a deliberate intention claim. The Blake court pointed to evidence demonstrating
that Skidmore's store constituted an unsafe working environment since it lacked
adequate security safeguards, which included Skidmore's failure to instruct
Blake as to what to do in case of a robbery.2t 3
In Feliciano, 7-Eleven fired Feliciano for failing to comply with a com-
pany policy prohibiting employees "from subduing or otherwise interfering with
a store robbery. 2t 4 This policy was designed to protect both employees and
customers from the harm that is likely to result if employees interfere under
such dangerous circumstances. Accordingly, this policy was one of the com-
means of escape, we might agree that the general policy favoring the preservation of human life
would prevent his employer from firing him for fighting back in self-defense").
208 559 S.E.2d 713, 725 (W. Va. 2001) (Maynard, J., dissenting).
209 493 S.E.2d 887, 897-99 (W. Va. 1997) (Maynard, J., dissenting).
210 Id. at 889. The deliberate intention exception to an employer's workers' compensation
immunity is found at W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2(c) (2003). See generally Mayles v. Shoney's, Inc.,
405 S.E.2d 15, 18-21 (W. Va. 1990).
211 See Blake, 493 S.E.2d at 889-90. A deliberate intention claim refers to a claim where an
employee brings a suit against his/her employer for a workplace injury that was "in whole or in
part caused by the employer's 'deliberate intention' to subject such employee to some workplace
hazard." Phillip R. Strauss, Deliberate Intention Claims Based on Third-Party Criminal Acts:
Blake v. John Skidmore Truck Stop, Inc., 101 W. VA. L. REV. 515, 516 (1999). In general em-
ployee injuries fall under worker's compensation and the employer is immune; however, when a
deliberate intention is found, an exception is applied and the employer loses its immunity. Id.
212 Blake, 493 S.E.2d at 897.
213 Id. at 895-96.
214 Feliciano v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 559 S.E.2d 713, 716.
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pany's time-tested security safeguards.2 5 As Justice Maynard pointed out,
however, when combined, the decisions in Feliciano and Blake pose a dilemma
for companies like 7-Eleven. Feliciano practically renders 7-Eleven's safety
policy unenforceable as a means of protecting employees during a robbery be-
cause the policy invites problematic enforcement and its mere existence trans-
forms any violation into a question of fact for a jury. "Nevertheless, [in light of
Blake,] the absence of this policy would probably cause this Court to uphold a
deliberate intention action against 7-Eleven arising from an injury to an em-
ployee caused when he or she attempted to subdue a robber. ' '21 6 Therefore, in-
stead of 7-Eleven being able to terminate an at-will employee who interferes
with a robbery without any liability, the company and similar businesses now
face being subjected to either a wrongful discharge claim or a deliberate inten-
tion claim, if the employee is injured, in addition to any potential claims from
customers also injured during such an altercation.
VII. CONCLUSION
In response to the certified question in Feliciano,217 the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals established a substantial public policy exception to
the at-will employment rule whereby an employee may use self-defense in re-
sponse to a "lethal imminent danger., 21 8 This decision leaves employers with
little guidance since courts will ultimately have to determine whether a "lethal
imminent danger" existed. It also creates judicial second-guessing of employer
management decisions and conflicts with the other specific public polices ex-
pressed by the legislature: protecting employees and the public. More gener-
ally, along with other recent public policy cases, Feliciano demonstrates that the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals is discovering public policies in dubi-
ous places, thus predicting where an employee will find a public policy excep-
tion is growing more difficult.
Being that the issue was before the court on a certified question of law,
the court was not at liberty to decide the case on its facts. However, the heroic
and emotional nature of events triggering the cause of action and their temporal
proximity to the September 1 lth tragedy no doubt influenced the majority's
decision. Feliciano represents the court's attempt to achieve equitable results
for the plaintiff; a result that ultimately comes at the expense of the rule of law
and has negative ramifications for employers, employees, and the general pub-
lic.
215 See supra notes 93-94 discussing 7-Eleven's policy and statistics on robbery nonresistance
policies.
216 559 S.E.2d at 724 (Maynard, J., dissenting).
217 559 S.E.2d 713 (W. Va. 2001).
218 Id. at 716.
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The state's substantial public policy exception is rapidly turning in to an
employer's nightmare. Since West Virginia adopted the public policy exception
in 1978,219 the court seems willing to discover public policy exceptions almost
wholesale. If one of the most significant employment law developments in the
last quarter of the twentieth century was the steady "erosion of the employment
at-will rule,, 220 one of the most significant developments in the first decade of
the new millennium may be the final demise of this doctrine.22' In West Vir-
ginia, the Supreme Court of Appeals may not expressly abolish the at-will doc-
trine in the near future, but it will likely continue to except the at-will rule -
pulling out any remaining "teeth" it has left.
Thomas H. Ewing*
219 See Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978).
220 PERRIT, supra note 2, at 3.
221 See Ballam, supra note 128, at 686.
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